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Market competition, human capital and corporate governance of state-owned and state holding


Abstract: This paper analyzes the classic principal-agent theory of corporate governance of state-owned and state holding the problem of the limitations that exist in that market competition on corporate governance of state-owned and state holding has a substitution effect, the substitution of competition in the market for business performance Incentive and constraints, and market competition on the state-owned shareholders and other stakeholders on the governance of behavior. Same article also analyzes the corporate governance of state-owned and state holding enterprises inalienable in human capital owners have control over the enterprises and the need for and feasibility of residual claim. Keywords: corporate governance of state-owned and state holding companies in market competition human capital theory of corporate governance since the 20th century origins the early 90s, Stanford University Professor Masahiko Aoki and Professor Qian Yingyi the first time, . After years of research, academia, government and business on the governance of state-owned and state holding company structure has been extensively studied, the formation of a rich theory of literature. Currently on corporate governance of state-owned and state-controlled literature study focused on the agency between shareholders and management problems, but development of the theory of corporate governance and the new situation faced by the enterprises are state-owned and state-controlled corporate governance theory and practice of innovation . 20 century until the mid-80s, the mainstream theories of corporate governance is a classic principal-agent theory, which many have strong explanatory power of the phenomenon, its ideological characteristics of the optimal contract is that all decisions are made in advance, and the problem is only after the implementation of the classic principal-agent theory is obvious defects, it can not on the organizational forms, property rights allocation, corporate governance, and many give a satisfactory explanation of social phenomena. In the study of corporate governance theory, H art (1999), developed by incomplete contract theory (incomplete contract theory, GHM), and Rajan (2000) and other scholars to introduce the enterprise of the connotation and extension of governance have a great expansion. With the latest developments in corporate governance theory, the use of the classic principal-agent theory to explain corporate governance of state-owned and state holding a variety of phenomena there is more problems, while state-owned and state holding companies and the external environment facing the enterprise itself there are large changes in the study of corporate governance of state-owned and state holding enterprises must face the current analysis of the new situation, in which the fierce market environment and human capital factors of changes in corporate governance have two of the most important factors. Product market competition has long been economists believe that the mechanism of corporate governance is an important part of the governance mechanisms currently being the world attach great importance to scholars. In addition, the human capital in the enterprise's position has changed, with the increased importance of human capital, as the rent (and control) is the source of the declining importance of physical capital, the state-required corporate governance mechanisms make the appropriate changes. Corporate governance in reality is difficult for discrete reached between the shareholders of collective action, as required by the different interests of the company after the formation of quasi-rent on the company negotiating the allocation mechanisms and institutional arrangements, the specific performance of the company investors ( or stakeholders) of the company's management is responsible for the implementation of incentives and constraints, and different shareholders or corporate conflict of interests between stakeholders coordination. First, corporate governance is not only protecting the interests of shareholders, not enough to explain the agency relationship in a variety of corporate governance,[link widoczny dla zalogowanych], the phenomenon of the external environment faced by enterprises and business itself, there is a big change, in the study of state-owned and state-owned Holding Companies must be on the current situation faced by the enterprises of the new analysis, in which the fierce market environment and human capital factors of changes in corporate governance have the two most important factors. Product market competition has long been economists believe that the mechanism of corporate governance is an important part, at present, is under the governance around the world attach great importance to scholars. In addition, the human capital in the enterprise status has changed, with the increased importance of human capital, as the rent (and control) the source of the importance of physical capital are falling, so the state-owned and state-controlled corporate governance mechanisms need to make the appropriate changes. Corporate governance of state-owned and state-controlled analysis of the problems present, most studies suggest that the state-owned and state holding the basic characteristics of corporate governance can be summarized as . Owned and state holding company's internal control problems were the cause of the first in the company's internal governance structure of the defect; followed by state-owned assets, measures; other initial client of the company's residual claim and control over the result does not match the incentives on behalf of the owner of state assets, lack of supervision and internal control power is generated by one of the reasons the problem. The design of the incentive system is not a formal arrangement, but through changes in corporate performance and executive positions to contact around the promotion, promotion and other personnel arrangement and the formation of an informal incentives rules. For the internal control issues, fees Fangyu that the process of SOE reform in China in a serious internal control problems and its external representation of a detailed analysis, pointed out that China's current corporate governance structure is imperfect in urgent need of reform. Liu Shijin that some corporate behavior can be puzzling situation by the governance structure be reasonably explained, if other forms of corporate mergers and restructuring of the actual damage to the operators of residual claims and resist to become their Conversely, if the merger will help it expand the residual rights of control and the actual residual claims, they are not only in favor of the merger, and may show a tendency to over-expansion. Jianmin beans that the control of the enterprise's internal causes of the problem is the internal governance institutions first of all the defects, a considerable number of Company Board and Managers of the original class by the company management personnel, lack of board members appraisal, rewards and punishments, appointment and removal of specific provisions, it is difficult to play the supervisory role of managers. Second, the state-owned assets, The most fundamental reason is the initial principal of the residual claim and control of enterprises do not match the result of state-owned assets on behalf of the owner of the incentive, lack of supervision of the power, and that the company's internal control of the problem is that client. Whether there is an optimal model of corporate governance, Weiying that optimal corporate governance structure should be a state dependent control structures that control the state of nature should be associated with different state enterprises should be required by the different interests to control. For example, when good corporate performance, the external one should be less involved in business affairs as a reward for managers, and poor performance, the external human intervention in the enterprise should be strengthened as a punishment for the manager; in normal conditions, when corporate performance fine, the shareholders should have control over the enterprise, when companies are struggling, the creditors should have control of the company, as shareholders of enterprises in the intervention is more passive than the creditor. Lin Yifu, scholars believe, from the modern Western model of corporate governance in developed countries, as well as specific monitoring mechanism for the control of the comparisons, any existing internal governance can not be unconditionally applied to all companies in the business environment , there is no monitoring mechanism to separate a complete work. Internal governance model and a specific monitoring mechanism is diverse, unique, and being in constant innovation. But the competitive market environment is for sure, is always formed under separation of ownership and effective enterprise system prerequisite. Wu Jinglian believes that both countries shared norms company system, because of different national market economy has its own characteristics. This was reflected in their own distinctive corporate governance structure. And a complete corporate governance structure needs to have the following property: ownership and control between the owners and managers of appropriate separation, so that the company leaders have full autonomy in order to achieve efficient management; business leaders should fully understand the shareholders, employees and the public on the company's expectations and to have sufficient incentive to strive to achieve this expectation; the company's shareholders, especially large shareholders should grasp the full information about the company's operations in order to determine whether their wishes have been realized, while hold sufficient authority and means managers can not realize their aspirations to take decisive action to intervene. From the above analysis we can see that the corporate governance of state-owned and state-controlled literature major shareholders and managers are focused on the agency problem between the concern for the state-owned and state holding company of property rights arrangements, and increasing the value of state assets But for Corporate Governance and China's special conditions and the new situation faced by the enterprises concerned but not enough, so for the corporate governance of state-owned and state-controlled studies have not been confined to the theory of the current system of Western countries.